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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 155 
Accident time: 08:05 Accident Date: 24/03/1999 
Where it occurred: Kapfudze village, 
Mukumbura 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 




At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a one-
man drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and 
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group 
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while 
excavating. 
An undated internal accident report was prepared by the Site Supervisor and made available 
by the managers of the demining group in April 1999. Another report compiled by the Site 
safety officer was made available in December 1999. 
Both reports agreed that the victim had located a signal with a Vallon detector and was 
investigating it with his prodder when the mine detonated at 08:05. The victim walked unaided 
to the base line where he was treated first by the team medic and then by the site doctor. 
The Site Supervisor stated that the victim was wearing his protective equipment correctly 
(indicated by the extent of injury and the pattern of mud splashes) and was using water to 
soften the ground as directed. He believed that the mine was lying on its side (as indicated by 
flash burns on one side of the crater).  
The Supervisor observed that the victim may have been prodding too close to the marker and 
that the Team Leader failed to notice or correct any breaches of SOPs [there was no 
suggestion that his partner should have corrected him]. His report stated that the team had 
stopped work and would undergo retraining before starting work again. Also that the Team 
Leaders would also undergo training in their respective supervision drills. 
 
The Site supervisor recommended that the group find alternative methods for investigating 
signals where the ground was hard or mines deeply buried. He observed that the steel safety 
clip [galvanised, shown above] was being found away from the mine, so masking the exact 
location of the mine. 
Deminers could start investigating a signal thinking they were 15cm behind a mine and then 
find that they were actually prodding directly onto it. He recommended that prodding should 
start 20-25cm behind a signal in future. 
The Site safety officer's team found that the victim's water carriers were at the end of his lane 
and unused, his apron and visor were dusty, his "marker triangle" [used to ensure that 
prodding started at the correct distance from a detector signal] was not used, that the crater 
was dry, shallow and "showed no signs that mine might have been tilted". The team checked 
the victim's working lane and found seven detector readings that had not been investigated. 
They found that the victim was not carrying out drills correctly and believed that the mine was 
outside the "row" so the victim had not treated the detector reading seriously and had not 
used water to soften the hard ground. 
 
Conclusion 
The Site safety officer's team concluded that the victim was negligent. They observed that his 
partner did not correct him, and neither did the Team Leader. They added that the fact that he 




The victim, his partner and the Team Leader were all dismissed "to make it very clear that 
violations of drills will not be tolerated". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 199 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used:  Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 




See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief report written by the doctor on site, dated 24th March 1999, was made available. The 
doctor stated that he attended the victim at 08:32 for "L. arm lacerations and contusions of a 
minor degree". He also stated that the victim was recovering well at camp and that he would 
be ready to return to work on 25th March 1999.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
appears to have been working in breach of SOPs when the mine detonated.  
The victim's 18" (15cm) prodder (made locally) was bent by the accident but remained in one 
piece as it was designed to do. 
 
Several other excavating accidents occurred in this mined area within weeks of this one. The 
area being cleared was a dense minefield with over 3000 AP mines per kilometre and as 
many as 200 mines being found each working day.  
The inconsistencies between the investigations (both by ex-pat senior staff) reveals an 
attempt to disguise the failings that led to the accident which is a management failing that the 
second investigation – by the Site safety officer – appears to correct. 
3 
The dismissal of the Field supervisor shows that his responsibility was recognised by the 
group’s managers.  
 
Related papers 
A covering letter dated 25th March 1999 stated that the victim was injured on his upper left 
arm and that he was treated in their "field hospital container".  
A notification form to the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence, undated but signed on behalf of the 
demining group, stated that the accident occurred in an "unmarked" area at 08:30. The area 
was described as rural woodland. [It was part of the "Ploughshear minefield".] 
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